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ABSTRACT: Though nihilism is a major theme in late modern philosophy from Hegel onward, 
it is only relatively recently that it has been treated as the subject of monographs and 
anthologies.  Commentators have offered a number of accounts of the origins and nature of 
nihilism.  Some see it as a purely historical and predominantly modern phenomenon, a 
consequence of the social, economic, ecological, political, and/or religious upheavals of 
modernity.  Others think it stems from human nature itself, and should be seen as a perennial 
problem.  Still others think that nihilism has ontological significance and issues from the nature 
of being itself.  In this essay, I survey the most important of these narratives of nihilism to show 
how commonly the advent and spread of nihilism is linked with changing conceptions of 
(humanity’s relation to) nature.  At root, nihilism is a problem about humanity’s relation to 
nature, about a crisis in human freedom and willing after the collapse of the cosmos, the 
erosion of a hierarchically ordered nature in which humans have a proper place.  Two themes 
recur in the literature:  first, the collapse of what is commonly called the “great chain of being” 
or the cosmos generally; and second, the increased importance placed on human will and 
subjectivity and, correlatively, the significance of human history as opposed to nature.   
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We typically regard nihilism as a problem about human life.  While Nietzsche and 
Heidegger are undoubtedly the thinkers most closely associated with nihilism, it has 
an important history (predominantly in Europe) before them and has led an 
interesting life (especially in American culture) after them.  Nietzsche’s proclamation, 
“God is dead!”, has been taken as the historical and philosophical fountainhead of 
European nihilism.  As with any idea, however, the history of nihilism is more 
complex, and over the last half-century a handful of scholars have set out to trace its 
elusive arc.1  Though nihilism is a major theme in late modern philosophy from Hegel 
                                                     
1 Michael Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995. Stanley Rosen, 
Nihilism: A Philosophical Study, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969.  Donald A. Crosby, The Specter of 
the Absurd: Sources and Criticisms of Modern Nihilism, Albany, SUNY Press, 1988.  Allan Bloom, The Closing of 
the American Mind, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.  Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, 
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onward, it is only relatively recently that it has been treated as the subject of 
monographs and anthologies.  Commentators have offered a number of accounts of 
the origins and nature of nihilism.  Some see it as a purely historical and 
predominantly modern phenomenon, a consequence of the social, economic, 
ecological, political, and/or religious upheavals of modernity.  Others think it stems 
from human nature itself, and should be seen as a perennial problem.  Still others 
think that nihilism has ontological significance and issues from the nature of being 
itself.  In this essay, I survey the most important of these narratives of nihilism to show 
how commonly the advent and spread of nihilism is linked, as it is by Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, with changing conceptions of (humanity’s relation to) nature.  At root, 
nihilism is a problem about humanity’s relation to nature, about a crisis in human 
freedom and willing after the collapse of the cosmos, the erosion of a hierarchically 
ordered nature in which humans have a proper place.  Two themes recur in the 
literature:  first, the collapse of what is commonly called the “great chain of being”2 or 
the cosmos generally; and second, the increased importance placed on human will 
and subjectivity and, correlatively, the significance of human history as opposed to 
nature.   
ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF NIHILISM 
Nihilism originated as a distinct philosophical concept in the 18th century.  As Michael 
Gillespie reports, “the concept of nihilism first came into general usage as a 
description of the danger [German] idealism posed for the intellectual, spiritual, and 
political health of humanity.  The first to use the term in print was apparently F. L. 
Goetzius in his De nonismo et nihilism in theologia (1733).”3  Tracts portraying Kantian 
critical philosophy as a form of nihilism appeared near the end of the century, but it 
would fall to F.H. Jacobi to give the first explicit formulation of the concept.  
Convinced that idealism posed an existential threat to traditional Christian belief, 
Jacobi attacked both Kant and Fichte, the former in his essay, “Idealism and 
Nihilism,” and the latter in a letter to Fichte in 1799.  He branded Fichte’s philosophy 
as nihilism by drawing a stark contrast between a steadfast faith in a God beyond 
human subjectivity and an insatiable reason that, as Otto Poeggeler puts it, “perceives 
                                                                                                                                           
Harper and Row, 1966. Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1995. Nishitani Keiji, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, trans. Graham 
Parkes, Albany, SUNY Press, 1990.  David Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern 
Situation, New York, Routledge, 1988. 
2 See Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, New York, Harvard University Press, 1936.  
3 Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 65.   
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only itself” and “dissolves everything that is given into the nothingness of 
subjectivity.”4  Jacobi believed that idealism entailed a lopsided focus on human 
subjectivity that not only shut out the divine, but severed itself from any external 
reality whatsoever, including nature.  If things-in-themselves cannot be cognized, and 
actuality itself is but a category of the understanding, then it seems to follow that 
things-in-themselves do not actually exist.  Idealism shifts, to use Gilson’s formulation, 
from the “exterior to the interior,” but does not make the move from the “interior to 
the superior”; in fact, it does not “move” at all, since the exterior—nature—is 
regarded as a realm of mere appearances.  For Jacobi, it is only through a decisive act 
of will, a recognition of the stark either/or before us and a resolute commitment to 
God, that humans can find their proper place.  As Jacobi challenges Fichte: “God is 
and is outside of me, a living essence that subsists for itself, or I am God.  There is no 
third possibility.”5   
Three things stand out in this passage.  First, Jabobi is simultaneously charging 
Fichte with pantheism and atheism, positions he regards as basically identical.  Before 
mounting his assault on idealism, Jacobi had argued that Spinoza’s pantheism was 
actually atheism.  Jacobi seems to have regarded Fichte’s idealism as a doomed 
attempt to marry the focus on freedom in Descartes and Kant to Spinoza’s holistic 
and divinized view of nature.  So nihilism is portrayed as emerging, roughly speaking, 
out of attempts to integrate modern conceptions of freedom and nature.  Second, 
Jacobi’s denial of a “third way” is, as we will see, a common complaint among critics 
of nihilism, or of philosophies alleged to be nihilistic.  Those who cannot accept the 
basic dualities and either/or’s of existence, so the thinking goes, attempt to sublate 
them in elaborate monistic philosophies that bend logic and language beyond their 
breaking points in order to chart a third way--to, in Kierkegaard’s turn of biblical 
phrase, join what God has separated.  The attempt to include everything ends up 
embracing nothing.  Third, it is more than a little ironic that Jacobi’s fideistic focus on 
the will, intended as an antidote to nihilism, would later be pointed to as a symptom 
of nihilism by Nietzsche because the will is directed toward a false object (God) and by 
Heidegger because the triumph of the will in modern thought is the fruition of the 
ancient seed of metaphysics, the drive to frame being as presence.   
With this story of the origin of the concept of nihilism in place, let us take a look 
at some of the most sustained attempts to determine the nature of nihilism. 
                                                     
4 Quoted by Parkes, Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, xvi. 
5 Quoted by Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 66. 
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A SURVEY OF THEORIES ON THE NATURE OF NIHILISM 
Nishitani Keiji.  Despite nihilism’s presence at the birth of German idealism (and 
prominence after its death), it was not to be made a subject of study in its own right 
until the 1930s and ‘40s, by Karl Löwith and the unlikely figure of Nishitani Keiji.  
Nishitani was a member of Japan’s Kyoto School, a vanguard of Japanese 
intellectuals, many of whom travelled to Germany to study with leading European 
thinkers and endeavored to integrate modern Western philosophy, particularly 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and the German Idealists, with Buddhist thought.6  Graham 
Parkes suggests that since, e.g., the Buddhist tradition never took substance or 
presence as foundational philosophical categories, it is no accident that one of the first 
relatively unified statements on nihilism was made by a non-Western philosopher:  
“Nishitani’s perspective has allowed him to see as more unified than Western 
commentators the stream of nihilism which springs from the decline of Hegelian 
philosophy through Feuerbach, Stirner, and Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and 
Heidegger.”7  In other words, from a Buddhist perspective rooted in the belief that all 
things are empty, finite, and lacking in “own-being,” the Western notions of being as 
standing presence or stable substance are obviously a poor foundation to build on. 
The hallmarks of Nishitani’s approach to nihilism in this text are a rigorous analysis of 
Nietzsche’s treatment of nihilism, a spirited defense of Nietzsche’s solution, the 
application of Buddhist conceptual tools to the problem, and a critique of atheistic 
positions such as those of Stirner, Marx, and Sartre.  He argues that Heidegger’s 
significance in the history of nihilism lies in his insistence on its connection to 
ontology:  “Heidegger gives us nothing less than an ontology within which nihilism 
becomes a philosophy.  By disclosing nothing at the ground of all beings and 
summoning it forth, nihilism becomes the basis of a new metaphysics.”8  One of the 
most important contributions of Nishitani’s account is his insistence that the deepest 
significance of nihilism is ontological, not merely psychological or cultural, and that its 
                                                     
6 Nishitani’s approach to nihilism is severely conditioned—and, some would argue, strengthened—by his 
Buddhist background.  The notion of nothingness or emptiness has been a foundational concept of 
Buddhist thought since Nagarjuna, and does not carry the negative connotation usually imputed to it by 
the Western tradition.  Some have argued that Buddhism is uniquely positioned for overcoming Western 
nihilism precisely because it is not built on the conceptual foundations that many modern thinkers now 
regard as unstable.  See, for instance, James Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School, 
Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2002. 
7 Parkes, Self-Overcoming of Nihilism. xx. 
8 Parkes, Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, 157. It bears mentioning that Nishitani’s interpretation is based 
primarily on Heidegger’s Being and Time and “What is Metaphysics?”, and addresses neither Heidegger’s 
later history of being nor his critique of Nietzsche.   
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rise in modern Western philosophy is a symptom of a failure to adequately grapple 
with the concept of the nothing. 
Karl Löwith.  If Nishitani’s approach to nihilism has the virtue of distance, Karl 
Löwith’s has the advantage of proximity.9  A student of Heidegger and an eye-witness 
to the real-world ravages of political nihilism in the rise of Nazism, Löwith provides a 
detailed account of the prominent role nihilism played in post-Hegelian European 
thought and culture, and he offers a rich account of the intellectual and cultural 
trends that culminated in Heidegger’s philosophy.  On Löwith’s telling,  
Ever since the middle of the [19th] century, the construction of the history of 
Europe has not proceeded according to a schema of progress, but instead 
according to that of decline.  This change began not at the end of the century 
but rather at its beginning, with Fichte’s lectures, which he saw as an age of 
‘perfected iniquity.’ From there, there proceeds through European literature 
and philosophy an uninterrupted chain of critiques…which decisively condition 
not simply the academic but the actual intellectual history between Hegel and 
Nietzsche.  The state of Being in decline along with one’s own time is also the 
ground and soil for Heidegger’s ‘destruction,’ for his will to dismantle and 
rebuild, back to the foundations of a tradition which has become untenable.10   
Fichte’s indictment of the present age would be the prototype for a long list of 
scathing critiques of modern society, from Kierkegaard’s The Present Age to Nietzsche’s 
Untimely Meditations.  Once Hegel had, as Löwith puts it, “made the negation of what 
exists” the principle of genuine philosophy, the task of philosophy would widely 
become identified with Zeitdiagnose, and the role of the philosopher was to become, as 
Nietzsche put it, the physician of culture.  Löwith shows how this spirit is embodied 
by thinkers as disparate as Marx and Kierkegaard:   
Marx’s worldly critique of the bourgeois-capitalist world corresponds to 
Kierkegaard’s critique of the bourgeois-Christian world, which is as foreign to 
Christianity in its origins as the bourgeois or civil state is to a polis.  That Marx 
places the outward existential relations of the masses before a decision and 
Kierkegaard the inward existential relation of the individual to himself, that 
Marx philosophizes without God and Kierkegaard before God—these apparent 
                                                     
9 Despite his Japanese and Buddhist perspective, Nishitani’s approach to nihilism appears to have been 
heavily influenced by Löwith’s three studies on nihilism in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the period 
between Hegel and Nietzsche, and Heidegger.  Given that Löwith lived in Japan for five years, his 
intellectual proximity with Nishitani is unsurprising.   
10 Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 192. 
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oppositions have as a common presupposition the decay of existence along with 
God and the world.11    
Both thinkers, he continues, “conceived ‘what is’ as a world determined by 
commodities and money, and as an existence defined throughout by irony and 
boredom.”12  Marx’s assertion of a purely “human” world and Kierkegaard’s espousal 
of a “worldless Christianity” both share in common the severance of the human from 
the natural.  For Marx, nature is merely the positum there to be negated and 
appropriated by human labor.  For Kierkegaard, as Walter Kaufmann quips, nature 
is irrelevant to human life:  “He sweeps away the whole conception of a cosmos as a 
mere distraction…  Here is man, and ‘one thing is needful’: a decision.”13  Hans 
Jonas, another of Heidegger’s students, detected a similar problem with Heidegger’s 
own account of human existence:  namely, that it did not place humans within any 
kind of scala natura that is the locus of value.  Löwith’s larger point, though, is that the 
disintegration of the Hegelian vision resulted in a grab bag of incompatible viewpoints 
usually consisting of a scathing critique of the present, a longing for a lost age, and/or 
a radical program for individual or social renewal.   
C.S. Lewis.  Another vital voice in the discourse on nihilism—and who also saw 
firsthand the fallout from political nihilism in the world wars of the 20th century--is 
C.S. Lewis.  Though Lewis does not explicitly mention the specter of nihilism in his 
classic The Abolition of Man, he clearly laments its corrosive effects on Western 
civilization and insists it arose largely due to a disruption in humanity’s relationship to 
nature.  The abolition of human nature, he hypothesizes, is the unintended 
consequence of the attempt to bend nature to human purposes and is the endgame of 
scientific naturalism.  Moreover, this attempt to defeat nature and scrub it free of 
undesirables results, paradoxically, in nature’s total victory.  The more of reality we 
concede to the objective, value-free domain of “mere nature,” the less free we 
become; or more precisely, the more freedom becomes a curse, because its polestars 
for navigating the field of possibilities—an objective morality rooted in nature or the 
“Tao,” Lewis’ catchall phrase for premodern notions of nature as a cosmos to which 
humans must conform—have been snuffed out.  The human is left with nothing but 
his drives and instincts to decide how to act; he is left, in other words, with nothing 
but nature to guide him.  But since this is not a cosmic nature with a logos, an ordered 
                                                     
11 Ibid., 202.  As we will see, this is a recurrent theme in genealogies of nihilism, namely, that thinkers 
occupying wildly different positions, such as Marx and Kierkegaard or Russell and Sartre, are both 
victims of nihilism.  The reason usually given for this is that nihilism is an prejudice deeply embedded in 
the foundations of modernity. 
12 Ibid., 202.   
13 Walter Kaufmann, ed., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, New York, Penguin, 1956, p. 16.  
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hierarchy of matter, body, soul, and spirit, but a nature bereft of reason or moral 
value, and since reason has been downgraded to a tool and morality whittled down to 
a matter of preference, it is a matter of the blind leading the blind; a matter, in short, 
of nihilism.  What happens, then, is that whatever someone happens to prefer is called 
natural.  Somehow, the attempt to make everything “natural” ends up denaturing the 
very notion of nature.   
Stanley Rosen and Allan Bloom.  Two writers who made similar observations about 
nihilism were both students of the political philosopher Leo Strauss:  Stanley Rosen 
and Allan Bloom.  Both trace the phenomenon to a gradual shift in the reigning 
conceptions of reason, morality, and nature throughout the modern period.  Like 
Lewis, Rosen describes nihilism as partly the collapse in the belief in objective moral 
truths, which is abetted by the widespread adoption of a non-normative, instrumental 
view of reason.  Once the will is decoupled from the intellect and no longer choosing 
from among the ends the intellect presents to it, and once the logos is removed from 
nature, then there are no longer any objective moral truths that the intellect can 
apprehend and present to the will as worthy candidates for action.  Everything falls to 
the will, and since the will cannot furnish reasons for acting one way or another—and 
since reason itself has been relieved of command to do so—then everything is 
permitted.  Rosen defines nihilism in this Nietzschean sense, and asserts that “For 
those who are not gods, recourse to a [value] creation ex nihilo…reduces reason to 
nonsense by equating the sense or significance of speech with silence.”14   
While nihilism is often regarded primarily as a moral position, e.g., value 
relativism, Rosen contends that the moral implications are in fact derivative and stem 
from a “contemporary crisis in reason” rooted in the problem of historicism.  Rosen 
defines historicism as “the view that rational speech about the good is possible only 
with respect to the meaning of history” and “the inability to distinguish being and 
time.”15  Historicism was ironically the unintended consequence of an attempted 
expansion of reason:  “the influence of mathematical physics led to the secularization 
of metaphysics by transforming it into the philosophy of history, whereupon the 
influence of history, together with the autonomous tendencies of the mathematizing 
ego, led to the historicizing of mathematical physics.”16  In other words, while the 
premodern task of philosophy, generally speaking, was (partly) to discern the 
unchanging logos within nature, in the modern period it is expanded to tracing the 
logos within history—but this leads, somehow, to the paradoxical view that all 
                                                     
14 Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Study, xiii. 
15 Ibid., xiv. 
16 Ibid., xvi. 
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rational speech is reducible to historical, i.e., contingent, conditions.  The strange 
thing is that such a nihilism can equally accommodate the view that “everything is 
natural”—since there is no reason or necessity governing human affairs and action, 
they are merely an arbitrary matter of chance, will, or instinct--and “nothing is 
natural”—since there are no trans-historical or trans-cultural metaphysical or moral 
truths and everything, including theses about nature, is a product of history.  
Rosen insists that the notion of “creativity” played an important part in this 
process.  According to this view, a person’s moral life consists not in obeying the 
dictates of a conscience common to all or by acting in accordance with his rationally 
knowable nature, but by being faithful to the oracle of his inner genius, the natural 
creativity welling up from below.  Once creativity, not reason, is enshrined as the 
center of gravity in human nature, the next logical step is to adopt the view that all 
speech about being—all philosophy, science, and mathematics—is poetry.  Rosen 
thinks that the influence of historicism on the view of reason and metaphysics, and the 
effect of the notion of creativity on the view of morality and human nature, are the 
main causes of the advent of nihilism:  “the fundamental problem in a study of 
nihilism is to dissect the language of historicist ontology with the associated doctrine of 
human creativity.”17  Heidegger and Nietzsche are the most important thinkers in this 
drama; Heidegger because of his attempt to think being in terms of time, and 
Nietzsche because of his reduction of all human faculties to a creative will to power.  
Though their diagnoses of nihilism are unparalleled, Rosen thinks their solutions are 
flawed because both are victims of the modern “rationalistic view of reason”:   
By detaching ‘reasonable’ from ‘good,’ the friends of reason made it impossible 
to assert the goodness of reason….  If reason is conceived exclusively on the 
model of mathematics, and if mathematics is itself understood in terms of 
Newtonian rather than Pythagorean science, then the impossibility of asserting 
the goodness of reason is the extreme instance of the manifest evil of reason.  
Reason (we are told) objectifies, reifies, alienates; it debases or destroys the 
genuinely human….  Man has become alienated from his own authentic or 
creative existence by the erroneous projection of the supersensible world of 
Platonic ideas…and so of an autonomous technology, which, as the authentic 
contemporary historical manifestation of ‘rationalism,’ will destroy us or enslave 
us to machines.18   
As such, since the good was not to be found by the light of reason, it had to found 
somewhere else; but since the very notion of good becomes unintelligible when 
severed from reason, it was nowhere to be found, and thus had to be created.  But since 
                                                     
17 Ibid., xvi. 
18 Ibid., xv. 
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the goodness of this creativity consists in its spontaneity and novelty, it must supply its 
own criterion and guarantee its own legitimacy. 
Allan Bloom devotes the middle act of his The Closing of the American Mind to what 
he calls “Nihilism, American Style.”  Despite its popular acclaim, the book contains a 
sophisticated account of nihilism.  Though the tenor of his treatment is similar to 
Rosen’s and though both thinkers emphasize the connection between nihilism and the 
modern view of nature, Bloom’s account is unique on at least two fronts.  First, he 
illustrates how nihilism has been democratized, normalized, and neutered in 
American culture; this watered down, latter day version of nihilism represents, for 
Bloom, the victory of Nietzsche’s “last man.”  Second, where for Rosen the main root 
of nihilism is the conception of reason that arose out of the scientific revolution, for 
Bloom it is the major shifts in modern political philosophy.  I will briefly illustrate 
these two fronts. 
In Bloom’s genealogy of nihilism, what was once the province of the German high 
culture of the 19th and early 20th century—the intellectual skyline so exquisitely 
sketched by Löwith—has been transfused into American popular culture and slang.  
The post-World War Two generation came to employ a menagerie of terms—
“values,” “lifestyle,” “creativity,” “the self,” and “culture,” to name a few—to replace 
traditional social and religious norms, but divested them of their original meanings, or 
at least their implications.  “Weber,” Bloom observes, “saw that all we care for was 
threatened by Nietzsche’s insight [that God is dead]….  We require values, which in 
turn require a peculiar human creativity that is drying up and in any event has no 
cosmic support.”19  But instead of introducing a mood of despair and a sense of the 
tragic, nihilism was parlayed into an ethos of self-help, the psychology of self-esteem, a 
therapeutic culture, and a glib relativism.  As Bloom writes, “There is a whole arsenal 
of terms for talking about nothing—caring, self-fulfillment, expanding 
consciousness….  Nothing determinate, nothing that has a referent….  American 
nihilism is a mood, a mood of moodiness, a vague disquiet.  It is nihilism without the 
abyss (CAM 154).  What irks Bloom is that Americans embraced the language of value 
and creativity with such ease, without gleaning their darker implications and ignorant 
of the turbulent intellectual, cultural, and political history that produced them.  
Reminiscent of Heidegger’s discussion of idle talk, Bloom notes how the nostrums of 
nihilism calcify into democratic dogma:  “these words are not reasons, nor were they 
intended to be reasons.  All to the contrary, they were meant to show that our deep 
human need to know what we are doing and to be good cannot be satisfied.  By some 
miracle these very terms became our justification:  nihilism as moralism” (CAM 238-
                                                     
19 Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, 150. Hereafter cited as CAM. 
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9).  This form of nihilism is the most insidious because the most unconscious, what 
Nietzsche called “passive nihilism.”  It is the most unconscious because its victims are 
unaware of their condition and incapable of contemplating alternatives. 
As we saw with Löwith, the prevailing outlook in European nihilism is one of 
pessimism and historical decline; but on American soil, seasoned with the spirits of 
egalitarianism and perpetual progress, nihilism winds up with a “happy ending” and 
wears a happy face.  Bloom thinks this improbable syncretism is more than a 
fascinating social and cultural phenomenon and has deep philosophical import 
because it perfectly embodies Nietzsche’s vision of the “last man,” the contented 
being who lives only for the present and is incapable of self-contempt or reverence for 
anything greater:  “Nihilism in its most palpable sense means that the bourgeois has 
won, that the future, all foreseeable futures, belong to him, that all heights above him 
and all depths beneath him are illusory and that life is not worth living on these terms.  
It is the announcement that all alternatives or correctives…have failed” (CAM 157).  
Bloom shares with Rosen the view that “Western rationalism has resulted in a 
rejection of reason,” and thinks that we live, in John Ralston Saul’s term, in an 
“unconscious civilization”:  “We are like ignorant shepherds living on a site where 
great civilizations once flourished.  The shepherds play with the fragments that pop 
up to the surface, having no notion of the beautiful structures of which they were once 
a part” (CAM 239).  
Bloom is convinced that most of this stems from the revolution in modern political 
thought brought about by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.  Whereas the ancients, 
generally speaking, relegated the best regime to the realm of speech and thought, 
doubtful about its possible instantiation in history, the moderns aimed to put the best 
regime into practice.  One of the most important instruments for doing so was 
positing a “state of nature,” a primal condition from which humanity extricates itself 
in order to achieve an optimal way of communal life.  A stark contrast has to be 
created between the natural and social orders in order for the rationality, legitimacy, 
and desirability of the political order to stick.  Nature has to be branded as indifferent 
if not hostile to human flourishing in order for the project to make sense, and human 
nature must be redrawn as a- or pre-political.  As Bloom puts it, “Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau all found that one way or another nature led men to war, and that civil 
society’s purpose was not to cooperate with a natural tendency in man toward 
perfection but to make peace where nature’s imperfection causes war” (CAM 163).  
Moreover, nature’s obstacles have to be conceived as surmountable through applied 
science:  “if, instead of fighting one another, we band together and make war on our 
stepmother [nature], who keeps her riches from us, we can at the same time provide 
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for ourselves and end our strife.  The conquest of nature, which is made possible by 
the insight of science and by the power it produces, is the key to the political” (CAM 
165).  But nature has to be conquered in two senses.  Before it can be literally 
conquered via applied science, it must be theoretically transformed from a great chain 
of being, a cosmos, into an ontologically homogenous plane of extended matter in 
motion.  Just as nature is reduced to its lowest common denominator, politics comes 
to be based not on virtue or the good, but on the most basic human drives:  the fear of 
death, the desire for comfort, and the goal of self-preservation.  This lowering of the 
human center of gravity—what Strauss called the “low but solid ground”20 on which 
the moderns built—is what eventually leads to Nietzsche’s last man . 
However, this foundation is highly unstable and its implications are deeply 
ambiguous.  Rousseau was the first to tap the fissure that would grow into the abyss 
addressed by Nietzsche, and this gap has to do with the new concept of nature.  As 
Bloom writes, “For Hobbes and Locke nature is near and unattractive, and man’s 
movement into society was easy and unambiguously good.  For Rousseau nature is 
distant and attractive, and the move was hard and divided man” (CAM 169).  
Rousseau, Bloom writes, realizes just how difficult it is to sever the ontological bond 
between nature and human nature, and that the attempt to do so creates great 
confusion:  “Now there are two competing views about man’s relation to nature, both 
founded on the modern distinction between nature and society.  Nature is the raw 
material of man’s freedom from harsh necessity, or else man is the polluter of nature.  
Nature in both cases means dead nature, or nature without man and untouched by 
man...” (CAM 173).  One view sees nature as the problem, while the other sees 
humanity as the problem; but both views, and all three thinkers, share the prejudice 
that nature is “dead,” i.e., bereft of soul or subjectivity and flatly opposed to the 
human order of history, politics, and society.   
Bloom gives an excellent summary of the difference between the ancient and 
modern views of nature:  
[In the modern view,] all higher purposiveness in nature, which might have 
been consulted by men’s reason and used to limit human passion, had 
disappeared.  Nature tells us nothing about man specifically and provides no 
imperatives for his conduct….  Man somehow remains a part of nature, but 
in a different and much more problematic way than in, say, Aristotle’s 
philosophy, where soul is at the center and what is highest in man is akin to 
what is highest in nature, or where soul is nature.  Man is really only a part 
and not the microcosm.  Nature has no rank order or hierarchy of being, 
nor does the self (CAM 176).  
                                                     
20 Quoted in CAM, 167. 
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This is the consequence of the collapse of the cosmos, the same disproportion between 
humanity and nature that Rosen points to.  There are no “natural limits” to the 
passions, because only the passions are natural, and all claims of reason are taken to 
be in some way derived from or motivated by them.  Humans have longings that 
formerly would have been correlated with dimensions of the cosmos, but since the 
higher levels of the great chain have been shorn off, leaving only the “low but solid 
ground,” Rousseau, determined to reprise the pursuit of wholeness that was formerly 
headed by reason, had nowhere to go but “back” before society and “down” into the 
pre-rational nether reaches of human nature.  Rousseau was seeking the norms that 
he would try to incorporate in his political vision, primarily equality.  Since reason—
which Rousseau, much like Heidegger, interprets as calculation—is responsible for 
disrupting the equality of the state of nature, it cannot be the source of the ideal order; 
instead, the sources for bringing about a harmony between humans and nature are 
freedom and sympathy.  In showing that the so-called “natural” bases of human life 
according to Hobbes and Locke were actually stones laid down by society, Rousseau 
attempted to drill down to the real state of nature, but ended up opening pandora’s 
box:  “Having cut off the higher aspirations of man, those connected with the soul, 
Hobbes and Locke hoped to find a floor beneath him, which Rousseau removed….  
And there, down below, Rousseau discovered all the complexity that, in the days 
before Machiavelli, was up on high….  It is here that the abyss opened up” (CAM 
176-7).  This is the fountainhead of what would become Nietzschean nihilism and 
eventuate in value-relativism.   
Donald Crosby.  While Rosen and Bloom give a heavily historical account of the rise 
of nihilism, Donald Crosby offers perhaps the most systematic and analytical account 
in The Specter of the Absurd: Sources and Criticisms of Modern Nihilism, detailing its different 
types, reconstructing the myriad arguments in its favor, and exposing its philosophical 
and theological sources.  Like both of them, though, he effectively shows how nihilism 
is a pervasive power in modern thought that underwrites seemingly contrary 
philosophical positions, such as voluntarism and determinism, and plagues thinkers as 
different as Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell.  But he follows Nietzsche and 
Heidegger in holding that Greek metaphysics and especially Christianity prepare the 
way for nihilism, and maintains that other traditions, such as process thought, might 
provide us with resources for confronting it.  Moreover, Crosby follows Lewis in 
calling for a new conception of nature, insisting, with philosopher of science Ivor 
Leclerc, that to combat nihilism, “what is urgently needed…is a restoration of the 
philosophy of nature to its former position in the intellectual life of our culture, a 
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position it had prior to the scientific revolution and continued to have up to the 
triumph of Newtonian physics in the 18th century.”21   
A) Types of Nihilism.  Crosby describes five types of nihilism:  political, moral, 
epistemological, cosmic, and existential.  Crosby is more concerned with the last two 
types. He cites Schopenhauer and Russell as unlikely bedfellows representing these 
views.  For Schopenhauer, he says, “All striving is rooted in deficiency and need, and 
thus in pain.  Each organized form of nature, including human beings, everywhere 
encounters resistance to its strivings and must struggle to wrest from its surroundings 
whatever satisfaction it can achieve” (SA 28).  For Russell, 
the cosmos is alien and inhuman and the values we cherish have no realization 
in it.  We must learn to accept that the natural world is oblivious to all 
distinctions between good and evil and that it is nothing but an arena of blind 
forces or powers…that combined by sheer chance in the remote past to effect 
conditions conducive to the emergence of life (SA 27).  
Whereas Schopenhauer holds that the cosmos has no intelligible structure 
whatsoever, Russell’s view is less extreme, in that he holds that mathematics and 
natural science can provide us with an accurate picture of nature, but one that will 
not include human values.  Russell’s universe is rationally knowable but finally 
meaningless.  Cosmic nihilism is then something of an oxymoron, since it means that 
there is no such thing as a “cosmos” in the sense of an intelligible and moral order in 
nature that humans can discover and conform to.  
From here, it is a short step to existential nihilism.  This view has been advanced 
most pointedly by writers such as Sartre and Camus.  Honesty demands that we face 
the absurdity of our existence and accept our eventual demise; religion and 
metaphysics are dismissed as happy hedges against death.  The mature person accepts 
all of this and slogs through, manufacturing meaning through projects chosen for no 
reason.  He cannot provide a reason for living, for the particular life he chooses, or for 
choosing not to live.   
Now Löwith, as noted above, saw the rise of existentialism and nihilism as 
consequences of the collapse of a view of nature as cosmos or creation.  Crosby notes 
the major shift from the medieval to the modern view of nature:  “The medieval 
method made the needs, purposes, and concerns of human beings the key to its 
interpretation of the universe; the scientific method tended to exclude human beings 
altogether from its concept of nature, thereby leaving the problem to philosophy of 
how to find a place for humans in, or in relation to, the natural order” (SA 202).  
Moreover, whereas the modern method conceived nature as a uniform plane of 
                                                     
21 Crosby, The Specter of the Absurd, 191. Hereafter abbreviated as SA. 
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being, the medieval method “took for granted…the twin notions that the universe was 
a domain of quality and value, and that it was a hierarchically ordered, pluralistic 
domains, consisting of fundamentally different levels or grades of being” (SA 203).  
Moderns of different stripes all accept the former prejudice.  The positivist and the 
existentialist may have quite different views, but they share the presupposition of 
cosmic nihilism.  My point here is that existential nihilism—the type that garners the 
most attention, both literary and philosophical—is derivative of cosmic nihilism.  
Here I think Crosby is wrong in claiming that existential nihilism is the primary 
philosophical type of nihilism.  Cosmic nihilism (a view about the status of nature) is 
more fundamental than existential nihilism (a view about the status of human beings).   
B) Sources of Nihilism.  Crosby traces many religious and philosophical sources of 
nihilism through the Western tradition, but here I just want to focus on two of the 
more general ones, since they bear directly on our conceptions of nature:  
anthropocentrism and value externalism.  Anthropocentrism, he explains, involves the 
subordination of nature to human beings and stems from the Judeo-Christian 
assumption that nature must revolve around us:  “we humans are either at the 
pinnacle of a nature regarded as subservient to our needs and concerns, or we are 
nowhere. Everything in the universe must focus mainly on us and the problems and 
prospects of our personal existence, or else the universe is meaningless and our lives 
are drained of purpose” (SA 128).  Once these unrealistic expectations are 
disappointed and we fall back to earth, the alternatives—dualism and materialism—
seem unsatisfying.  It is as though we had resided so long on a mountaintop that the 
lowlands came to seem inhospitable.  But Crosby points out that our pique at 
realizing we are not the center of the universe is conditioned by our clinging to 
anthropocentric views.  Hence while Crosby laments the loss in the transition from 
the medieval to the modern view of nature that I mentioned above, he approves of, 
e.g., Nietzsche’s critique of the Christian view:  “Nietzsche is correct when he claims 
that the anthropomorphic assumption is a fundamental cause of nihilism. ‘We have 
measured the value of the world,’ he says, ‘according to the categories that refer to a 
purely fictitious world…. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naievete of man: 
positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things’” (SA 129).  The 
premodern cosmos is thus criticized as (at least in part) an unwarranted projection of 
human interests, qualities, and desires.  Whitehead shows how this is echoed in the 
modern period:  “The individual subject of experience has been substituted for the 
total drama of reality.  Luther asked, ‘How am I justified?’; modern philosophers have 
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asked, ‘How do I have knowledge?’ The emphasis lies upon the subject of 
experience.”22   
This brings us to the second source of nihilism, what Crosby calls the “externality 
of value.”  This notion, he says, “requires that we deny that nature has, or can have, 
any intrinsic significance; it supposes that the only value or importance it may have is 
that which is externally bestowed” (SA 131).  Originally this assumption took root in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, the idea that the goodness of nature and natural beings 
lay in the fact that they were created by God.  Later, however, once the cosmos is 
collapsed and God disappears, humans replace him as the value-bestowers in chief.   
In conclusion, Crosby thinks that though nihilism has considerable problems as a 
philosophy—especially its embrace of “false dichotomies” such as “faith in God or 
existential despair, a human centered world or a meaningless world” --it is a necessary 
halfway house between untenable modern and premodern philosophies and 
something new (SA 364).  In addition to having a useful debunking function and a 
laudable emphasis on human freedom, it drives home the “perspectival nature of all 
knowledge, value, and meaning” (SA 366).  When viewed against the backdrop of the 
Western tradition, perspectivism—such as that of Nietzsche—comes off as a great 
calamity and a crass relativism.  But Crosby submits that this reaction is not 
necessary:  “To be finite and time-bound is no disaster but simply the character of our 
life in the world.  The philosophy of nihilism can help us to acknowledge and accept 
our finite state by forcing us to give up the age-old dream of attaining a God’s-eye 
view of things” (SA 366). Though Crosby appears to cast Nietzsche as a nihilist, I 
think this was precisely Nietzsche’s conviction:  that nihilism is a painful but necessary 
and even salutary stage through which humans come to terms with the interpretive 
aspect of their view of nature, abandon otherworldly visions, and realize that nature is 
an ever-evolving complex of perspectives, none of which command a total view of 
reality.  Nihilism opens us up to a “constructivist” view of nature; the difficult part, as 
Crosby notes, is not lapsing into a radical idealism, where nature is dissolved into a 
positum of the human subject, precisely Jacobi’s critique of Fichte.  But here we just 
need to note that Crosby, one of the most astute contemporary scholars of nihilism, 
draws the connection between nihilism and nature. 
Michael Gillespie.  Michael Gillespie offers perhaps the most revisionist account of 
nihilism, arguing that its roots can be traced from late medieval nominalism to 
Descartes’ epistemological revolution, Fichte’s absolute idealism, and the “dark side” 
of Romanticism.  The principle source of the concept, he contends, is the rise of the 
capricious, voluntaristic, omnipotent God unleashed by nominalism.  Long before 
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Nietzsche pronounced the death of God, the seed of nihilism was sown by the birth of 
the God of nominalism.  It was not the weakness of the human will that lead to 
nihilism, but its apotheosis.  According to Gillespie,  
Nietzsche’s definition of nihilism is actually a reversal of the concept as it was 
originally understood, and…his solution to nihilism is in fact only a deeper 
entanglement in the problem of nihilism.  Contrary to Nietzsche’s account, 
nihilism is not the result of the death of God but the consequence of the birth or 
rebirth of a different kind of God, an omnipotent God of will who calls into 
question all of reason and nature and thus overturns all eternal standards of 
truth and justice, and good and evil.  This idea of God came to predominance in 
the fourteenth century and shattered the medieval synthesis of philosophy and 
theology….  This new way was in turn the foundation for modernity as the 
realm of human self-assertion.  Nihilism thus has its roots in the very foundations of 
modernity….23   
Not only is Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the cause of nihilism—the death of God—
wrongheaded, but his cure fails because he is unconscious of the prejudices guiding 
his valorization of the will to power.  Nietzsche’s spirituality of the Dionysian over-
god-man, try as it might to escape the gravity of Christianity, remains squarely within 
the ambit of one of its mutations in the transition from the medieval to the modern 
period.  “The Dionysian will to power,” Gillespie writes, “is in fact a further 
development of the absolute will that first appeared in the nominalist notion of God 
and became a world-historical force with Fichte’s notion of the absolute I….  
Nietzsche’s Dionysus…is thus not an alternative to the Christian God but his final 
and in a sense greatest modern mask” (NBN xxi).  Gillespie’s account is, by his own 
admission, not entirely original in that it is a modification of Heidegger’s view that 
Nietzsche was merely the crest of the wave of the will that motored modern 
philosophy from Descartes onward, but his novel claim is that that power was 
unleashed by the rupture of the medieval cosmos at the hands of the nominalists.  
Here, I want to look more closely at a few of the planks in Gillespie’s account in order 
to highlight the centrality of two themes we have seen again and again throughout 
this essay:  the collapse of the premodern cosmos and the increased focus on 
subjectivity and the will.   
Gillespie contrasts nominalism with the thoroughgoing realism of medieval 
scholasticism.  Though the latter certainly embraced divine omnipotence, this was 
usually seen as somehow limited by the perfect order of creation which reflected the 
perfect order of the divine mind.  The divine will and the divine intellect are seen as 
                                                     
23 Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, xii-xiii. Hereafter abbreviated NBN. 
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integrated.  The notion of a completely arbitrary and all-powerful divine will would 
be seen not as a true representation of God’s freedom but as a reflection of fallen, 
human freedom.  Moreover, for realism the divine will is not entirely inscrutable, 
since it produces an order that can be understood by observing nature, an intelligible 
cosmos reflecting it.  As Gillespie recounts,  
The metaphysics of traditional scholasticism is ontologically realist in positing 
the extramental existence of universals such as species and genera as forms of 
divine reason known either by divine illumination…or through an investigation 
of nature, God’s rational creation.  Within such an ontology, nature and logic 
reflect one another….  On this basis, it is possible to grasp the fundamental 
truth about human beings and their earthly duties and obligations (NBN 12).   
The “loose end” of this realism that the nominalists would exploit, however, is divine 
omnipotence.  “While no one denied God’s potentia absoluta (absolute power),” 
Gillespie writes, “scholastics generally thought that he had bound himself to a potentia 
ordinate (ordered power) though his own decision.  The possibility that God was not 
bound in this way but was perfectly free and omnipotent was a terrifying possibility 
that nearly all medieval thinkers were unwilling to accept” (NBN 14).  It is the 
widespread acceptance of this possibility, Gillespie contends, that formed the 
foundations of modernity and spurred the rise of nihilism. 
The compound influence of Ockham and others was to normalize what had been 
a minority view in the medieval period:  negative theology, the general notion that the 
ontological difference between God and humans (and God and nature) is so great that 
we cannot achieve any positive or analogical knowledge of his nature.  The 
decoupling of human reason and God and the prioritization of divine omnipotence 
laid the groundwork not only for a new theology focused on revelation and faith alone 
(instead of natural theology and the complementarity of faith and reason), but a new 
understanding of nature.  As Gillespie notes, “The effect of the notion of divine 
omnipotence on cosmology was...revolutionary.  With the rejection of realism and the 
assertion of radical individuality, beings could no longer be conceived as members of 
species of genera with a certain nature or potentiality….  The rejection of formal 
causes was also the rejection of final causes” (NBN 21).  Denied access to God, reason 
would now be focused squarely on knowing nature in a more precise, certain, and 
complete way, and in the process, as we saw Rosen describe above, reason itself 
would undergo a decisive change.  Since reason can no longer discover teloi in 
nature—including the human telos—it loses its normative status, and its sole task is 
instrumental, and the ends to which it is put are prescribed not by reason itself, but by 
the will.  Gillespie notes that this is the root of Descartes’ project of doubt: “The will 
as doubt seeks its own negation in science in order to reconstitute itself in a higher and 
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more powerful form for the conquest of the world.  Science and understanding in 
other words become mere tools of the will” (NBN 43).  Doubt is undertaken as a 
security measure needed to protect against a dangerous and unpredictable nature 
created and unregulated by a capricious God.  God and nature can no longer be 
looked to for practical guidance.  Humanity must seek its proper ends within itself.  
But since its reason can no longer recognize itself as an instance of a natural kind that 
fits within an ordered cosmos (in the sense of both intelligible and purposive), its 
reason cannot do the job, and all that is left is the will.  In Gillespie’s view, all of this 
signals a drastic shift from a model of God as “craftsman” to a vision of God as 
“artist”:   
The nominalist emphasis upon divine omnipotence overturned [the] conception 
of natural causality and established divine will and efficient causality as 
preeminent.  God was thus no longer seen as the craftsman who models the 
world on a rational plan, but as an omnipotent poet whose mystically creative 
freedom foams forth an endless variety of absolutely individual beings….  This 
‘cosmos’ is devoid of form and purpose, and the material objects that seem to 
exist are in fact mere illusions (NBN 53).    
As I mentioned near the start, the first philosophical usage of the term nihilism 
occurred when F.H. Jacobi alleged that Fichte’s absolute idealism was nihilistic. As 
Gillespie writes,  
In [Fichte’s] interpretation of Kant…it became his goal to break the enslaving 
chains of the thing-in-itself and develop a system in which freedom was 
absolute….  Such a system in Fichte’s view could be established only by a 
metaphysical demonstration of the exclusive causality of freedom, and this in 
turn could be achieved only by a deduction of the world as a whole from 
freedom (NBN 76).   
Freedom must be conceived not as a mere postulate that must be assumed because of 
a nature thoroughly determined by efficient causality (i.e., nature according to Kant 
via Newton), but as the principle of this nature in the first place.  Fichte exacerbated 
the fault line between freedom and necessity broached by nominalism and wedged 
wider by Descartes:  “Nihilism…grows out of the infinite will that Fichte discovers in 
the thought of Descartes and Kant.  Fichte, however, radicalizes this notion of 
will…transforming the notion of the I into a world creating will” (NBN 66).  This 
world-creating will is not, however, the will of the individual ego, but the source of all 
manifestation that alienates itself in nature:  “Reality is merely a by-product of this 
creative will that seeks only itself….  The I of the I am is not a thing or a category but 
the primordial activity which brings forth all things and categories” (NBN 79).  Nature 
is not an independent order:  it is a spontaneous, free creation of the will, a negation 
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of the absolute I.  For Fichte, the moral struggle of humanity is the story of the I 
becoming reconciled to itself.  Nature is nothing but the obstacle in the finite self’s 
path toward recollecting its original infinitude; or, put differently, nature is nothing 
other than an instrument for the perfection of humanity.  
CONCLUSION 
In presenting these accounts, I have highlighted their tendency to see the origins and 
nature of nihilism as tightly bound up with the concept of nature.  This was done to 
bring to light the gamut of influences informing Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s 
engagements with the problem of nihilism.  The sources are several:  Greek 
metaphysics, Christian theology, late medieval nominalism, modern science, politics 
and culture, the advent of the philosophy of history, and German Idealism.  The 
diagnoses are different:  some see nihilism as a historically contingent phenomenon; 
some think it is rooted in human nature; and some think it issues from the nature of 
being itself.  What they all have in common, though, is the notion that nihilism has 
something to do with a disruption in the relationship between humanity and nature, 
and many of them hold that overcoming or at least attenuating it involves developing 
a new conception of nature.  There must be an alternative, in other words, to the 
positivism and scientific naturalism that rule the day because such a universe has no 
place for meaning and value; it offers no ground or justification for human values, and 
mocks human intuitions about the value of nature.  Moreover, a common thread in 
the accounts is that nihilism involves the emergence of the view that the human will is 
the source of all meaning and value, and that the latter are in no way discovered but 
are purely created. 
In closing, my hope is that this narrative of the origins, development, and nature 
of nihilism might serve as a conceptual and historical backdrop for the contemporary 
project in environmental philosophy to “re-enchant the world” by recovering the 
meaning, value, and purpose that modern conceptions of nature by and large drained 
from the world.  The search for a new cosmology or an alternative, non-reductive 
nihilism springs from a recognition of the nihilistic consequences of scientific 
naturalism. 
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